Publication Showcase

Latent territorial threat and democratic regime reversals

Anonymous — Thu, 01 Jul 2021 20:20:30 +0000

Latent territorial threat and democratic regime reversals Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 07/01/2021 - 14:20

Latent territorial threat and democratic regime reversals

By: Johannes Karreth, Jarroslav Tir, Douglas M. Gibler

Abstract:

Why do some democracies revert to non-democratic forms of governance? We develop an explanation of democratic reversals that emphasizes the influence of states’ external border relations on domestic politics. Latent threats to a state’s territory encourage political centralization of authority in the executive to defend against danger to the homeland. Latent territorial threat also facilitates the construction and maintenance of large land armies to fight threatening neighbors. Combined, latent territorial threat increases leaders’ domestic power, weakens democratic institutions, encourages other conditions threatening democratic survival, and, ultimately, leads to democratic reversals. Synthesizing prior research on territorial conflict, we generate a quantitative, continuous measure of latent territorial threat against all democracies with contiguous neighbors from 1946 to 2016, using Bayesian estimation. Empirical tests accounting for measurement uncertainty and other common determinants of reversals as well as brief reviews of individual cases of reversal provide robust evidence that democracy failed at higher rates in countries facing high levels of threats to their territory from neighbors. Our study implies that a complete account of the development of democratic institutions should emphasize that domestic factors alone fall short of explaining why democracies fail.

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Exchange rates and immigration policy

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 21:40:47 +0000

Exchange rates and immigration policy Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 06/03/2021 - 15:40

Exchange rates and immigration policy

By: Adrian Shin

Abstract:

What explains cross-national and temporal variations in migrant rights? This article argues that policymakers implement more exclusionary or inclusive policies toward migrants in response to exchange-rate fluctuations. Since exchange rates affect the real value of remittances, exchange-rate depreciation of the host state’s currency makes migration less valuable for existing and potential migrants, while exchange-rate appreciation increases the degree of migrant pressure on the host state by doing the opposite. This well-documented relationship between exchange rate valuation and migration movements affects how host country governments craft immigration policy. Under exchange-rate depreciation, policymakers will implement more inclusive policies to deter the “exit” of migrants and maintain a stable supply of labor. Under exchange-rate appreciation, increased migration pressures heighten public anxiety over immigration in the host country, in turn causing policymakers to restrict further immigration by implementing more exclusionary policies. Consistent with the argument, the empirical results show that the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) currency values of migrants’ home countries are positively correlated with more pro-migrant policies in host countries.

Learn more Here: Exchange rates and immigration policy

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Migration and Economic Coercion

Anonymous — Thu, 03 Jun 2021 21:36:53 +0000

Migration and Economic Coercion Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 06/03/2021 - 15:36

Migration and Economic Coercion

By: Brendan J Connell, Samantha L Moya, Adrian J Shin

Abstract:

Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideration for potential sanctioners. Economic sanctions often increase the economic distress on the target country, which in turn causes more people to migrate to countries where their co-ethnics reside. Countries hosting a large number of nationals from the target country face a disproportionately high level of migration pressure when sanctions increase emigration from the target country. Therefore, policymakers of these countries oppose economic sanctions on the target country as an attempt to preempt further migration. Analyzing the sanctions bills in the European Parliament from 2011 to 2015, we find empirical support for our prediction.

Learn more here: Migration and Economic Coercion

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Voice and Inequality

Anonymous — Thu, 27 May 2021 21:19:37 +0000

Voice and Inequality Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 05/27/2021 - 15:19

Voice and Inequality

By: Carew Boulding

Abstract:

The first large-scale study of political participation in eighteen Latin American democracies, focusing on the political participation of the region's poorest citizens.

Political regimes in Latin America have a long history of excluding poor people from politics. Today, the region's democracies survive in contexts that are still marked by deep poverty and some of the world's most severe socioeconomic inequalities. Keeping socioeconomic inequality from spilling over into political inequality is one of the core challenges facing these young democracies. In Voice and Inequality, Carew Boulding and Claudio Holzner offer the first large-scale empirical analysis of political participation in Latin America. They find that in recent years, most (but not all) countries in the region have achieved near equality of participation across wealth groups, and in some cases poor people participate more than wealthier individuals. How can this be, given the long history of excluding poor people from the political arena in Latin America?

Boulding and Holzner argue that key institutions of democracy, namely civil society, political parties, and competitive elections, have an enormous impact on whether or not poor people turn out to vote, protest, and contact government officials. Far from being politically inert, under certain conditions the poorest citizens can act and speak for themselves with an intensity that far exceeds their modest socioeconomic resources. When voluntary organizations thrive in poor communities and when political parties focus their mobilization efforts on poor individuals, they respond with high levels of political activism. Poor people's activism also benefits from strong parties, robust electoral competition and well-functioning democratic institutions. Where electoral competition is robust and where the power of incumbents is constrained, the authors find higher levels of participation by poor individuals and more political equality. Precisely because the individual resource constraints that poor people face are daunting obstacles to political activism, Voice and Inequality focuses on the features of democratic politics that create opportunities for participation that have the strongest impact on poor people's political behavior. Ultimately, Voice and Inequality provides important insights about how the elusive goal of political equality can be achieved even in contexts of elevated poverty and inequality.

Voice and Inequality

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Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses

Anonymous — Thu, 27 May 2021 21:16:29 +0000

Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 05/27/2021 - 15:16

Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses

By: Jaroslav Tir

Abstract:

A key challenge in survey research is social desirability bias: respondents feel pressured to report acceptable attitudes and behaviors. Building on established findings, we argue that threat-inducing violent events are a heretofore unaccounted for driver of social desirability bias. We probe this argument by investigating whether fatal terror attacks lead respondents to overreport past electoral participation, a well-known and measurable result of social desirability bias. Using a cross-national analysis and natural and survey experiments, we show that fatal terror attacks generate turnout overreporting. This highlights that threat-inducing violent events induce social desirability, that researchers need to account for the timing of survey fieldwork vis-à-vis such events, and that some of the previously reported post-violent conflict increases in political participation may be more apparent than real.

Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses

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Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State Legislatures

Anonymous — Thu, 27 May 2021 21:05:07 +0000

Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State Legislatures Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 05/27/2021 - 15:05

Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State Legislatures

By Srinivas C. Parinandi

Abstract:

Although a long literature has analyzed how policies diffuse or spread across the American states, scant attention has been given to how states invent or create original policy instead of borrowing existing policy from one another. In this article, I use state legislative policymaking with respect to renewable portfolio standards to examine when legislatures invent original policy instead of borrowing existing policy. I use a novel data set that includes the state adoption of hundreds of policy provisions, including their combinations, and I employ logistic pooled event history analysis to identify the determinants of inventing and borrowing. I find that government ideology largely predicts inventing, whereas electoral vulnerability predicts borrowing. The results suggest that ideologues spearhead invention and further suggest that democratic accountability works chiefly through promoting borrowing rather than blunting inventing.

Policy Inventing and Borrowing among State Legislatures

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Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes

Anonymous — Thu, 27 May 2021 20:45:38 +0000

Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 05/27/2021 - 14:45

Can Exposure to Celebrities Reduce Prejudice? The Effect of Mohamed Salah on Islamophobic Behaviors and Attitudes

By: Ala Alrababah, William Marble, Salma Mousa, Alexandra Siegel

Abstract: Can exposure to celebrities from a stigmatized group reduce prejudice toward that group writ large? We estimate the causal effect of Mohammed Salah—a visibly Muslim soccer player— joining Liverpool Football Club on Islamophobia, using hate crime reports throughout England, 15 million tweets from British soccer fans, and a survey experiment of Liverpool F.C. fans. We find that hate crimes in Merseyside (home to Liverpool F.C.) dropped by 16% compared to a synthetic control, and Liverpool F.C. fans halved their rates of posting anti-Muslim tweets relative to fans of other top-flight clubs. Our survey experiment suggests that the salience of Salah’s Muslim identity enabled positive feelings toward Salah to generalize to Muslims more broadly. Providing real- world behavioral measures of prejudice reduction and experimental evidence from a naturalistic setting, our findings provide support for the parasocial contact hypothesis, indicating that positive exposure to outgroup celebrities can reduce prejudice.

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Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses

Anonymous — Thu, 20 May 2021 20:25:37 +0000

Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses Anonymous (not verified) Thu, 05/20/2021 - 14:25

Threat-Inducing Violent Events Exacerbate Social Desirability Bias in Survey Responses By : Shane P. Singh and Jarslav Tir

Published : 14 May 2021

Abstract:

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Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries

Anonymous — Mon, 17 May 2021 20:11:54 +0000

Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries Anonymous (not verified) Mon, 05/17/2021 - 14:11

Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries

Published: 21 February 2018

Abstract:

Civil wars are among the most difficult problems in world politics. While mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some positive results in helping to end civil wars, they fall short in preventing them in the first place. In Incentivizing Peace, Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth show that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent armed conflicts into full-scale civil wars. The authors demonstrate that highly-structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the World Bank, IMF, or regional development banks) are particularly well-positioned to engage in civil war prevention. When such IGOs have been actively engaged in member states on the edge, their potent economic tools have helped to steer rebel-government interactions away from escalation and toward peaceful settlement. Incentivizing Peace provides enlightening case evidence that IGO participation is a key to better predicting, and thus preventing, the outbreak of civil war.

Learn more here: Incentivizing Peace

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Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union

Anonymous — Wed, 13 Jan 2021 21:04:07 +0000

Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union Anonymous (not verified) Wed, 01/13/2021 - 14:04

Angin, M, Shehaj, A, & Shin, AJ. Inside job: Migration and distributive politics in the European Union. Econ Polit. 2020; 00: 1– 25. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12170.

Published: 06 January 2021

Abstract:

Migration has become a top policy priority of the European Union (EU) in the wake of the 2015 migrant crisis. Given the significant ramifications of non‐European immigration for its member states, the EU has implemented a variety of policies to minimize popular backlashes within the borders of its wealthiest member states, which are also popular final destinations for migrants. In this article, we show that the EU offers financial incentives to its migrant‐transit member countries in exchange for holding migrants traveling from the Middle East and North Africa region within their territories. We use a subnational dataset on Southern Italy to examine the effects of migrant arrivals by boat on the amount of the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund received by each autonomous region between 2006 and 2018. In addition, we provide a cross‐national analysis of EU expenditures using data on unauthorized border crossings into the EU between 2009 and 2018. We find robust empirical support for the argument that the EU channels more funds to jurisdictions located on the major migrant‐transit routes.

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